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Aspects of the Legal, Political and Policy Issues
that will Confront the U.S.-Japan Trading
Community During the Remainder of the 1980's
by William L. Dickey*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he purpose of this article is to explore aspects of the legal, political
and policy issues that will confront U.S.-Japan trade relations during
the remainder of the 1980's. Virtually all trading partners have differ-
ences over trade policies and practices, and U.S.-Japan trade history has
been no exception. This, however, is a natural consequence of two highly
competitive trading nations seeking commercial advantages in the same
dynamic markets.
II. RETRoSPECT: JAPANESE IMPORTS AND ANTIDUMPING
Before considering the prospective legal, political and policy issues
which face U.S.-Japan trade relations, it will be advantageous to review
the trends of the last several years. During the late 1960's general imports
into the United States escalated dramatically and became a substantial
competitive factor in the U.S. market for the first time. Table I illustrates
the increases in the value of imports. The impact is evident.
* Partner, Dickey & Moore, Washington, D.C.; J.D., George Washington University
School of Law, 1962; Professor of Law, University of South Dakota, 1962-63; Minority
Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, 1963-64; Deputy Assistant
Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1969-72. The author has focused on the SIA
semiconductor petition as presenting an excellent case study for purposes of both defining
and focusing on the issues presented under the general label of "industrial targeting."
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Table I
Indexed Value of General Imports
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Source: U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1977 Bus. Statistics, The
Biennial Supplement to the Survey of Current Business (21st Biennial ed. Mar. 1978).
Japanese imports into the United States followed this same pattern
of dramatic escalation. (See Table II.)
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As a reaction to the price competition that imports generated, an-
tidumping proceedings became a popular remedy. Numerous imported
products were confronted with antidumping investigations, especially
during the 1971-72 and 1977-78 economic cycles. (See Table IIn.)
Table III
New Antidumping Investigations Commenced by Year
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of Commerce, Office of Investigations, International Trade
Specifically, an antidumping remedy was often sought by U.S. com-
panies that were hurt by Japanese competition. (See Table IV.) A major
factor in the frequency of these investigations was the exchange value of
the U.S. dollar in the Japanese and other foreign markets.'
' It should be noted that the United States entered negative trade balance cycles in its
merchandise account for both the 1971-72 and 1977-78 cycles. The merchandise trade bal-
ance upswing occurred during the 1973-76 period. Trade balances began a slide into an ap-
proximate $32 billion deficit during 1977. Correspondingly, the weighted-average index of
the exchange value of the U.S. dollar dropped remarkably fast along with the trade balance
figures. The weighted-average index started down from 120.23 in April of 1971 to a low of
92.7 in July of 1973. The dollar then increased in relative value. It began a slow, steady
decline from 104.4 in June of 1977 to 94.74 in June of 1978 to 89.5 in June of 1979. During
1980, the dollar remained at a relatively constant low level, but started up again at the end
of 1981 and has since remained strong. The conventional wisdom of the 1970's seemed to
have been that the strength of the dollar would move in a pattern with trade balance per-
formance, i.e., trade deficits would weaken and surpluses would strengthen the relative value
of the dollar. However, during the 1980-82 period two factors seem to have diminished the










Sources: Records of United States Customs Service; Federal Register; Fed - Track Guide to
Antidumping Findings and Orders.
While some antidumping activity continues,' it has significantly di-
minished as a factor in U.S.-Japan trade. At this time, only eight com-
modities (three from 1982 and five from 1983) from Japan are the subject
of new investigations.3 However, considerable compliance activity contin-
First, interest rates in the United States were abnormally high. Second, the belief among
investors that, given widespread political, financial or military instability in other nations of
the world, the United States provided the most secure haven for investment. It might be
fair to speculate that a weak dollar'will generate more dumping activity, but given the eco-
nomic anomolies of the last few years, it is difficult to speculate about what would cause the
dollar to drop precipitously causing widespread dumping problems between the United
States and several of its trading partners. A somewhat similar pattern occurred in the 1977-
78 period.
2 Table IV shows two things: Investigations commenced and actual dumping findings as
the darker subset within the respective columns. It should be noted that although a few
investigations had been initiated prior to 1968, there had been no findings of dumping until
the television case determination of June 18, 1968. In retrospect, that determination seems
to constitute some kind of a milestone or turning point in U.S.-Japanese trade relations'and
introduced an entire new sphere of consideration for Japanese manufacturers and importers.
The "action/reaction" dynamics then took hold as companies learned how to deal with and
avoid antidumping consequences, and that, coupled with the strength of the dollar, has re-
sulted in a great diminution of new dumping investigations after 1977. What should also be
noted is that the 1982 and 1983 proceedings related to relatively minor trade commodities
compared to those of the 1970's. It should also be noted that imports from Japan in 1983
will approximate $40 billion, compared to imports from Japan approximating $5.9 billion in
1970. For a review of the pattern of antidumping investigations since 1960, see the Appendix
to this article.1 1982: High Capacity Paging and Alerting Devices from Japan, 47 Fed. Reg. 37,312
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ues vis-a-vis dumping findings that have been in place for up to several
years.4
The decline in antidumping activity has occurred for several reasons.
Firstly, the value of the dollar (as of this writing) is relatively strong
against the yen, and a strong dollar tends to erase dumping margins. Dur-
ing weak dollar periods especially when the dollar declines precipitously,
dumping margins appear.5 Secondly, the Japanese have moved the pro-
duction of many import sensitive commodities into the United States.
This was done specifically to avoid customs entry problems, such as an-
tidumping investigations or orders.' Thirdly, Japanese and U.S. indus-
tries seem to be entering into more joint ventures, supply agreements and
other arrangements which preclude or discourage the filing of complaints.
Further, because many complaints are brought through trade associa-
tions, association members with joint venture interests often veto associa-
tion action adverse to the interests of their Japanese partners.7 Fourthly,
there has been a tremendous increase in the up-front costs that must be
incurred by the complaining U.S. industry to convince the International
Trade Association (ITA) and the International Trade Commission (ITC)
that there is sufficient merit to a complaint to warrant initiation of a for-
mal investigation." Because of the sophisticated procedures introduced by
the Trade Agreement Act of 1979, the investigation process demands
more day-by-day participation of counsel for the complaining industry."
The aggregate effect of these changes is high and unavoidable costs for a
domestic industry in prosecuting a complaint clearly a substantial inhib-
(1982); Portland Hydraulic Cement from Japan, 47 Fed. Reg. 4417 (1982); Steel Pipes and
Tubes from Japan, No. 731-TA-87, Jan. 28, 1982;
1983: Cyanauric Acid and its Chlorinated Derivatives from Japan, 48 Fed. Reg. 27,453
(1983); Lightweight Polyester Filament Fabric from Japan, 48 Fed. Reg. 1359 (1983); and
Tapered Roller Bearings and Components from Japan, 48 Fed. Reg. 4743 (1983); Steel
Valves and Parts from Japan, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,319 (1983); Spindle Belting from Japan, 48
Fed. Reg. 36,677 (1983). See FED-TRAcK PUBLICATIONS, FED-TRAcK GUIDE TO ANTIDUMPING
FINDINGS AND ORDERS. (As of Oct. 31, 1983).
" Approximately 33 dumping findings against specific commodities from Japan remain
under some phase of compliance activity by the International Trade Administration. Such
compliance work relates to findings in place as far back as 1968. Fed-Track Guide, supra
note 3.
1 Dickey, Antidumping: Currency Fluctuations as a Cause of Dumping Margins, 7
INT'L TRADE L.J. 67 (1982).
6 For example, such companies as Hitachi, Sharp, Sanyo, Mitsubishi and NEC, manu-
facturers of a host of electronics-related commodities, in recent years, have moved produc-
tion facilities into this country.
7 This observation is based upon the author's personal experience; however, because of
confidences, etc., the author does not feel free to disclose particulars.
Pryor, Litigation Cost One Cause of Shifting Trade Practice, Legal Times, Oct. 5,
1981, at 1.
' Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
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iting factor. In order to avoid antidumping consequences, foreign produc-
ers and importers have been forced to study, understand and take pre-
ventive planning to deal with antidumping laws and their implications.
This allows for preventive planning by importers/exporters. It is, there-
fore, much more difficult for companies to engage in dumping.1"
The consequence of these developments is the shift from resolving
U.S.-Japan trade conflicts at the specific product level before U.S. regula-
tory agencies to resolving them at the governmental level with the negoti-
ations carrying broader industrial impact. For example, the U.S. resolved
the "television wars" with a series of orderly marketing agreements."1
Steel products,12 automobiles' s and textiles 14 also have been the subject of
negotiations and, in some instances, marketing agreements and quotas.
These matters generally have been resolved by high-ranking governmen-
tal negotiators rather than administrative agencies or courts. Further, a
concentrated effort by U.S. negotiators to decrease competition in certain
areas (and open Japanese markets) is underway. 15 Bargaining points for
the U.S. negotiators include threats of local content legislation, 6 denial of
investment tax credits for products imported from countries engaged in
"0 Before 1968, little information on dumping was available because of the low inci-
dence of dumping activity and because instances of dumping could be settled by a simple
letter of assurance. Dumping was not a significant practical problem in the international
trade community. Little was written on the subject and few people had any experience'at all
with the subject. The subject was not taught in the schools. In general, it was not a problem
contemplated by international traders. After 1968, the U.S. Department of Treasury
stopped accepting letter assurances that prices would be maintained above dumping levels.
Instead, it initiated investigations to determine whether there had, in fact, been dumping.
New regulations were prepared and published and an entire body of law on the subject
emerged. Almost all of that law developed after 1970. It took considerable time for the legal
concepts to emerge and be generally understood by both the legal and trading communities.
11 These agreements are coterminus with an earlier OMA with Japan in effect since
July 1977. TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 107 (1979).
12 TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 114 (1981-82). Ambassador Brock stated on November 1,
1983:
The Government of Japan has decided to restrain exports of passenger vehicles to
the United States at a level of 1.85 million units for the year beginning April 1,
1984. The United States has expressed its appreciation to Japan for making such
a difficult decision. I would particularly like to thank MITI Minister Uno for his
tireless efforts to resolve this most troublesome issue.
Transcript of a press conference given by Ambassador William Brock (Nov. 1, 1983).
1S TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 115.
14 Id. at 118.
15 Furakawa, Urge Japan to Further Open Markets to U.S. Imports, ELECTRONIcS
NEWS, Jan. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
16 H.R. 5133, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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unfair trade practices 17 and reciprocity legislation.' s
A large measure of the shift in emphasis from corporate funded ad-
ministrative proceedings on specific commodities to governmental negoti-
ations is attributable to the extremely high cost of pursuing antidumping
and related actions. It takes an enormous trade volume and substantial
injury to justify the high expense of pursuing such private remedies. Sev-
eral actions have demonstrated the nearly prohibitive costs of this
course.'9 In some instances, even if the domestic industry is successful in
the litigation, the penalties can be circumvented by moving all or simply
a portion of the manufacturing process to a location within the customs
territory of the United States. The domestic industry will have won the
battle but lost the war. With capital intensive, high plant investment in-
dustries which are not easily portable, domestic industries can get greater
satisfaction from their legal investment because if they are successful in
their antidumping suit enough uncertainty is created in the market to
close out the foreign competition.
III. PROSPECT: COMPETITION IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY
During the next several years, the greatest number of novel, interest-
ing and challenging issues in U.S.-Japan trade relations will be generated
by competition in high technology areas. Perhaps anticipating this devel-
opment, the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade released An As-
sessment of U.S. Competitiveness in High Technology Industries in late
1982.11 In its analysis the study concluded:
The United States occupies a unique leadership position in the
world political and economic structure-a leadership role underwritten
by its preeminence in advanced technology. The possible erosion of this
17 Houdaille Industries, Inc., Petition to the President of the United States through the
Office of the United States Representative for the Exercise of Presidential Discretion Au-
thorized by Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 (May 3, 1982).
18 By voice vote on April 21, 1983, the United States Senate passed S. 144, a "reciproc-
ity" measure, however the matter was dropped in conference. It has been attached to H.R.
3398 which is currently pending in the Congress. It passed the House (amended) by Yea-
Nay Vote: 368-43 (Record Vote No. 225, H4569), was referred to the Senate Committee on
Finance on June 29, 1983, (S9483) and was reported to the Senate (amended) by the Senate
Committee on Finance. Finally, it was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar. It should
be noted that there has been a "seemingly constant series of missions by U.S. trade negotia-
tors to Tokyo, who pressed the Japanese to open up their markets to goods from the United
States." See 15 NAT'L J. 2162 (1983). With the economic recovery, it would seem that the
protectionist trend has not developed to the extent feared.
2' For example, those actions involving televisiong, automobiles and steel, supra notes
12-14 and accompanying text.
20 WHITE HOUSE CABINET COUNCIL ON COMMERCE AND TRADE, AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S.
COMPETITIVENESS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (Dec. 1982) [hereinafter cited as STUDY].
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preeminence could have far-reaching economic, political and national se-
curity consequences for the United States.... As the high-technology
industries of other countries have emerged as strong international com-
petitors, U.S. high-technology industries are facing a significantly altered
competitive environment. In the new environment, the United States
faces a major challenge to maintain its broad technological preeminence.
... Over the last twelve years, there has been a decline in the interna-
tional market position of U.S. high technology industries from a position
of dominence to one of being strongly challenged. Market share for the
high-technology group-and for nearly all individual industries-has
fallen. Foreign competition in high technology has increased dramati-
cally, with developments in selected new areas indicating that technologi-
cal advantages have shifted overseas.
An array of factors influence U.S. versus foreign advances in technol-
ogy. The most important of these across all industries are:
-the overall state of domestic economy,
-cost and supply of capital,
-relative R&D efforts,
-the transfer of technology,
-availability of scientists and technicians, and
-explicit industrial policies toward technology-intensive sectors.2 1
President Reagan, in his State of the Union Address delivered in
early January 1983 stated:
But, as surely as America's pioneer spirit made us the industrial giant of
the 20th century, the same pioneer spirit today is opening up another
vast front of opportunity-the frontier of high technology. In conquering
the frontier we cannot write off our traditional industries, but we must
develop the skills and industries that will make us a pioneer of tomorrow.
This Administration is committed to keeping America the technological
leader of the world now and into the 21st century.2 2
These statements manifest the concern expressed by our political
leaders that the United States maintain an independent leadership posi-
tion in the high-technology area. Similarly, Japan is striving to achieve
dominance in this area. With its special emphasis upon commercial devel-
opment of computer and semiconductor technology, Japan is far and
away the United States' most dynamic world competitor in the high-tech-
nology area. It is this direct competition that will generate the trade law
issues of the 1980's.
21 Id. at Executive Summary.
22 President's State of the Union Address, 19 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 102 (Jan. 25,
1983).
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IV. CASE STUDY: THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
In January of 1983, the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA)
published The Effect of Government Targeting on World Semiconductor
Competition, a Case History of Japanese Industrial Strategy, and Its
Costs for America.2 3 This comprehensive document begins as follows:
The purpose of this paper is to describe the decade or more of coordi-
nated effort by the Japanese government to put the Japanese semicon-
ductor producers in a dominant world-wide position in key product lines.
The Japanese government has worked closely with private Japanese
firms to reorganize the industry; rationalize production; protect its home
market; subsidize research, development, and production; and in a num-




The SIA document goes on to describe what it perceives as a number
of actions taken by the government of Japan to support "target" commer-
cial development of the semiconductor industry. Specifically, the SIA
document provides credible support for allegations that the Japanese
government:
1. Orchestrated a formal industry-government consultative process
that operated to establish industry-wide goals and specific company as-
signments for development of different aspects for semiconductor pro-
duction, which consultation and assignment process continues today on
an on-going basis.
25
2. Relaxed anti-monopoly and related legal constraints in order to
permit information sharing, joint activities, mergers of competing compa-
nies, elimination of price competition, market allocations, etc., among the
companies selected to perform specific functions. SIA alleges such activ-
ity normally would be considered violative of Japan's antitrust and other
unfair trade practice legislation.
2
3. Subsidized research and development through direct grants. 27
4. Directly and indirectly arranged for soft, low-interest loan pack-
ages, some of which required no payback unless and until the relevant
project turned an adequate profit. 8
5. Provided discriminatory favorable tax treatment by way of spe-
cial depreciation and other tax benefits.
29
2 SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT TARGETING ON
WORLD SEMICONDUCTOR COMPETITION, A CASE HISTORY OF JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY,
AND ITS COSTS FOR AMERICA (Jan. 1982) [hereinafter cited as SIA PAPER].
24 Id. at V.
25 Id. at 17.
28 Id. at 3, Figure A and App. A.
2I Id. at 3 and App. B.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 3 and Figure A.
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6. Preserved home markets by restricting all government procure-
ment to Japanese production, and by urging Japanese firms to "buy Ja-
pan" through "administrative guidance."30
7. Preserved the private sector market for selected Japanese pro-
ducers and eliminated price competition by setting up exclusive and spe-
cial lease-financing arrangements.31
8. Restricted access to foreign imports and Japanese partners.32
The SIA document also indicates a significant loss of markets by U.S.
companies to Japanese competition in this area. Further, other na-
tions-France, Germany, Taiwan, Korea-are now beginning to emulate
Japan and are implementing their own government-backed versions of
the Japanese targeting program to promote the growth of their high-tech-
nology industries.3
3
For the narrow purposes of this article, the writer, though not neces-
sarily in agreement, will proceed under the assumption that a sufficient
factual basis exists to support the assertions of the SIA. Again, the objec-
tive of this article is to examine the legal and policy consequences that
potentially follow from the alleged factual pattern.
The SIA seeks the following remedy:
1. An announced U.S. policy "that foreign industrial targeting
practices will not be allowed to undermine U.S. technological and eco-
nomic leadership in this critical industrial sector."
2. A program to identify, analyze and counter the distorting effects
of foreign industrial targeting practices in the United States.
3. An insistence by the U.S. government that U.S. firms receive
commercial opportunities in Japan equal to those enjoyed by Japanese
firms in the U.S. market, i.e.: that Japan abandon its "buy Japan" poli-
cies, that U.S. subsidiaries in Japan enjoy equal access to local Japanese
capital markets on the same terms as those enjoyed by MITI-favored
Japanese firms, that U.S. companies in Japan should be permitted to es-
tablish and develop manufacturing and research facilities in Japan, and
to participate on the same basis as MITI-favored firms and that
Japanese firms should demonstrate no sales are below cost.
4. U.S. governmental enforcement of Japan's obligations in multi-
lateral forums, i.e. GATT and the MTN Subsidies Code.
5. A model, formed of such policies, for dealing with targeted in-
dustry practices in other countries.
6. Federal statutes conferring "the authority and means necessary
to ensure that the U.S. Government can carry out the policies and mea-
3D Id. at 69.
31 Id.
32 Id.
' Id. at 111.
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sures outlined above effectively." 34
The foregoing sets up some frustrating dilemmas for the United
States. It is obvious and well-recognized by U.S. government officials that
U.S. supremacy in the high-technology area is critical to its long-term ec-
onomic and military security. It is also apparent that the- semiconductor
industry is one of the basic staples of the future of high-technology devel-
opment. Semiconductors are very likely to determine the level of a coun-
try's computer, telecommunications, robotics, aerospace and other high-
technology industries in the future. The reason is that microchips now
constitute the core components of highly sophisticated products. Some
consider semiconductors "the crude oil of the 1980's."
5
The SIA seems to have made its case that it is rapidly losing its lead-
ership in this critical area to the Japanese. It seems to be generally per-
ceived that control over product development is essential to produce com-
petitiveness." A very interesting observation was recently reported in
The Washington Post, in an interview with C. J. Van der Klugt, vice-
president and vice-chairman for consumer products of Philips, n.y., a
Dutch firm. The report states:
Van der Klugt... believes that U.S. companies lost out to the Japa-
nese because of American management's "strictly black-and-white, bot-
tom line approach."
The downhill slide began some years ago in the radio business ....
When U.S. companies discovered that the Japanese could make radios
more cheaply than they could, they either gave up trying to compete or
subcontracted with them, first for components, then for the whole radio.
The result was that the American lead was gradually frittered away.
The same thing happened in the electronics field, according to
[Wisse Dekker, President of Philips]. When U.S. companies began con-
tracting out to the Japanese, they lost the control over product develop-
ment, which Philips considers vital to competitiveness.'
Upon this basis, the assumption follows that the vital interests of the
United States are in fact being threatened by Japanese competition in
the "targeted" semiconductor industry. At this point, the issue becomes
how the United States should respond legally. It was reported in The
Washington Post on February 11, 1983, that:
The United States and Japan have agreed to open Japan's markets and
its government-sponsored research to American companies in the in-
s, Id. at 104.
35 JAPAN ECON. J. 7 (June 29, 1982).
36 SIA PAPER, supra note 23, at 1.
37 Vandervort, Dutch Firm Set to Challenge the Japanese, Washington Post, Feb. 13,
1982, at G3, col. 1.
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creasingly important field of high technology... The agreement, ap-
proved by the Japanese and U.S. cabinets, attacks what many experts
consider an area of world trade where American dominance is being
threatened by policies of the Japanese government, which selected high
technology as an industry for special support. The agreement does not
have the force of a treaty, however, and requires voluntary compliance by
both governments.3 8
While it appears that some progress has been made through negotiations
in response to the complaints voiced by the SIA, it also appears that the
core problems remain.
However, based upon generally available information and reinforced
by the study, An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness in High Technol-
ogy Industries,9 the problems about which U.S. industries like the semi-
conductor industry complain have little relationship to controversial Jap-
anese practices. U.S. industry must be careful not to blame domestic
problems on "foreign devils," thereby denying the United States' own
deficiencies."
The following are some fundamental questions concerning the gen-
eral pattern of the SIA complaints and pleas for governmental action:
1. To what extent are these industrial problems the result of the
United States' endemic economic problems of an overvalued dollar, high
U.S. interest rates, restrictions resulting from our own export control
program, lack of export financing, and other basic comparative advantage
Auerbach, Japan to Ease Curbs on U.S., Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1983, at D8, col.
3.
3, STUDY, supra note 20.
40 Other problems are hurting our international competitive posture, specifically, wage
disparities, productivity growth, and the focus on short term profits:
Hourly compensation in the 1970's increased at an average 9.1% clip, more
than double the average gain in the 1960's. In Japan, the rate of gain actually
slowed, and in Germany it moved up only modestly. The average hourly wage in
the U.S. auto industry in 1982 was $19.43, as opposed to $7.22 in Japan and
$12.94 in Germany. U.S. Steelmakers earned an average of $22.74 per hour, while
their Japanese and German counterparts make $10.18 and $11.51, respectively.
From the 1960's to the 1970's, productivity growth in the U.S. slowed sharply.
Although growth in output per man-hour also decreased in other countries, it still
continued to show healthy gains. As a result, U.S. unit labor costs have been grow-
ing faster than in any other major industrialized country except Britain for the
past 10 years, helping to undermine international competitiveness.
For its part, management continues to focus on short-term profits rather than
building and maintaining market shares both at home and abroad. "If an industry
goes down, the first thing they cut is export promotion efforts," says the Chamber
of Commerce's Brennan. Such cutbacks by U.S. companies contrast with the high
export priority of European and Japanese competitors, who cling tenaciously to
market footholds even during business slumps.
America's Hidden Problem, Bus. WK. 66 (Aug. 29, 1983).
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factors such as wage rates, production efficiencies, relatively fewer scien-
tists and engineers, etc.?
2. Is it not true that many United States practices, such as govern-
ment-funded research and development, joint ventures among competing
firms and "Buy American" practices, parallel the criticized Japanese
practices?
3. Are there not adequate remedies on the books to counter, in
proper measure, the effects of the alleged subsidy and sales below-cost-
factors?
V. U.S. PROBLEMS ENDEMIC TO ALL U.S. TRADE
A. Overvalued Dollar
In a study released by the National Association of Manufacturers, it
is reported that the United States is losing ground in trade in almost
every kind of manufactured goods and that overvaluation of the dollar is
the "most important single factor." The dollar might be overvalued by as
much as 25%.41 One distinguished commentator stated that the dollar is
"now more overvalued than at any time since 1971," and the current ex-
change rates are "totally out of line with the better performance Japan
and Germany have demonstrated in improving their productivity, holding
down inflation and increasing exports of manufactured goods. 14 2 As a re-
sult, Japanese and German manufacturers have a built-in price advantage
in world markets, making it "extremely difficult" to reverse the steady
decline in our overall trade competitiveness. 43
B. High Interest Rates
A comparison of interest rates between Japan and the United States
reflects great disparities during much of the relevant period. (See Table
V.)
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Undoubtedly, the high interest rates experienced in the United States
over much of the relevant period have suppressed capital investment in
the United States. SIA has alleged "disinvestment" in the semiconductor
industry by virtue of Japanese trade practices which the SIA claims to be
"unfair."'44 In lieu of the interest rate disparity, however, it is not easy to
sort out the relative proportion of the decreased capital investment in the
United States attributable to the relatively higher cost of capital from
that attributable to any specific practice.
C. Export Controls and Financing
Some U.S. company presidents are complaining of the impact of ex-
port controls on foreign sales. For example, at a recent conference one
participant complained, "I see too many instances where the U.S. is
shriveling in high technology as a result of foolish export control proce-
dures .... -45 Another stated, "All of we [sic] companies have had the
experience of failing to get an export license, only to have a Japanese or
European company ship an identical product or technology.... "46 A re-
sponsible assistant secretary of commerce stated, "[T]here may be some
inhibition of competition," but these "are essential because of the exten-
sive diversion of U.S. high technology to the Soviet Union from Western
Europe.' 47 While it is difficult to assess the true extent of the impact of
this inhibition, it remains a factor, having negative impact on the ability
of U.S. companies to reach foreign markets, that has nothing to do with
the criticized Japanese practices. 48
4 SIA PAPER, supra note 23, at 58.
4 Robertson, Call for National High Tech Policy to Meet Foreign Threats, Eixc-
TRONIC NEWS, Feb. 7, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 In a speech before the National Press Club on September 29, 1983, Philip Caldwell,
Chairman of the Board, Ford Motor Co., is reported to have said that the United States
cannot compete on equal terms against "imports at home or in markets abroad" because its
tax structure is not as well designed to serve international trade as that of most exporting
countries. "The Japanese with their commodity tax, and most other industrial nations with
their value-added taxes, have discovered how to make their tax systems competitive in
world trade. The U.S.A. has not," he said. To illustrate his point, Caldwell noted that U.S.
made goods shipped to Japan "carry a full load of taxes when they leave our shores, and
then Japan often adds a sizeable commodity, or consumption-type tax, when they get
there." Conversely, he went on, "when a Japanese car is exported to the United States,
Japan doesn't levy the consumption tax... and there is no commensurate tax collected in
this country. That's worth something like $600 a car to the Japanese," the Chairman ex-
plained. If, on the other hand, the United States could solve the dollar-yen and tax
problems, the trade imbalance would disappear and effective pressure for protectionism
would cease, Caldwell maintained. "If this were to occur, you would never hear another
word from me about import restraint," he said. 9 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 26 (Oct. 5, 1983).
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Similarly, the United States, in recent years, has curtailed the Ex-
port-Import Bank's capability to provide financial assistance for exports,
which has had an undetermined impact on the ability of U.S. firms to
reach some foreign markets.
49
VI. U.S. PRACTICES SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE JAPANESE
Another issue to consider before declaring "targeting" to be "unfair"
is whether the United States, itself, engages in similar practices. Review-
ing the specifics of the SIA complaint reveals many parallel U.S. policies.
The difference seems to be that U.S. policies are not as narrowly focused
on a specific commodity, such as semiconductors.5 0
A. Cartels
The SIA document alludes to price floors and market allocations in
the U.S. market. It points specifically to government sponsored and sub-
sidized joint research ventures.51 For example, the United States licenses
export cartels pursuant to the Webb-Pomerene Act 52 and also partici-
pates in research joint ventures, specifically dealing with this area.53
How should the United States react to a foreign government's sup-
port for its commercial sector or to its relaxation of antimonopoly laws to
encourage cooperation among competing private-sector entities? Is it ap-
propriate to characterize such actions as "unfair"? U.S. antimonopoly
laws are predicated largely upon populist concepts that only the fullest
measure of competition will produce the most goods at the best price for
the consumer, and these concepts have served well for many decades. An-
timonopoly laws not only work, but also they are vital to commerce in
general. However, there may be specialized areas where it would be in the
national interest to advance the frontiers of knowledge through joint gov-
Also commenting on U.S. tax policy, Lawrence A. Fox, Vice President for International
Affairs at the National Association of Manufacturers, claims:
It is badly out of tune with our trading partners. The American system, which
relies mainly on direct taxes, "rewards imports and penalizes exports." By con-
trast, European-style value-added taxes and their equivalents-such as Canada's
excise tax on manufacturers and Japan's commodity tax-are rebated to exporters
but are slapped onto imports from the U.S. and other suppliers.
America's Hidden Problem, Bus. WK. 66 (Aug. 29, 1983).
" Robertson, supra note 45.
60 This discussion includes only some aspects of parallel policy. Other aspects in which
foreign competition is frozen-out of the U.S. market is not discussed.
51 SIA PAPER, supra note 23, at App. B.
52 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRIcTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, ORGANI-
ZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, EXPORT CARTELS 1974.
53 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DMSION, ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING RESEARCH
JOINT VENTURES (Nov. 1980).
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ernment/industry projects and through selected relaxation of antitrust
laws to achieve specific goals. According to the assertions of the SIA, the
cooperative approach utilized by the Japanese promotes product develop-
ment and production economies to the point where the parallel U.S. in-
dustry, operating in a competitive environment, cannot compete." If the
United States admits that the Japanese manner of organizing commerce
is more efficient in the high technology area, it should be imitated, not
attacked. Given the high cost of research and development, the high
levels of capital required for production facilities, and the vital national
interest in securing the highest level and fastest pace of advances in this
area, the high-technology area may call for a restructuring of our an-
timonopoly and private enterprise system for that special sector. The
United States could create a two, three, or four-tiered structuring of its
antimonopoly concepts, depending upon the character of the industry.
B. Government Subsidized Research and Development
Certainly there is nothing unusual about government-financed re-
search and development (R&D). Virtually all industrial nations fund
R&D for three basic purposes: 1) to meet government needs, such as de-
fense; 2) to enhance the science and technology infrastructure; and 3) to
stimulate the development of the commercial and technological infra-
structure.15 A government study concluded:
[I]n 1981 the U.S. government sponsored almost half of all R&D con-
ducted in the United States, about $32.9 billion and real growth of ap-
proximately 4 percent is estimated for 1982. Of this amount, 52 percent
went for national defense, 14 percent for space, 11 percent for health and
10 percent for energy. The scale and relative support for military R&D is
unique. Outlays for R&D by our major trading partners tend to focus on
projects with significant payoffs in the commercial sphere.. ." In 1980,
the last year for which international data are available, the U.S. govern-
ment expenditures for R&D, $29.6 billion, were a third greater than
those for Japan, West Germany, and France combined ($22.2 billion).
The Japanese government sponsored 25 percent of all R&D conducted in
Japan in 1980, about $5.7 billion; the West German government spon-
sored 48 percent, about $9.1 billion; and the French government spon-
sored 62 percent, about $7.4 billion.57
SIA PAPER, supra note 23, at 103.
" STUDY, supra note 20, at 26. In the United States, the major beneficiaries of this type






The United States follows a wide-spread and increasing pattern of
"Buy American" policies providing 6%, 12% and 50% preferences for do-
mestic commodities or, in some cases, providing for total domestic pro-
curement set-asides.5 8 Two recent examples of such set-asides are the
100% domestic procurement policies set forth for hand tools59 and the
"Buy American" provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act
of 1982.60 This Act provided, in a $52.85 billion procurement, that steel,
cement and manufactured products would be of a domestic source unless
use of such domestic material "will increase the cost of the overall pro-
ject by more than 10 per centum in the case of projects for the acquisi-
tion of rolling rock, and 25 per centum in the case of all other projects." '
VII. UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE REMEDIES
Questions of subsidization seldom lend themselves to easy analysis,
but the United States does have on its books both antidumpings 2 and
countervailing duty laws63 designed to meet any unfair advantage that the
Japanese might have secured by industrial subsidies or sales below fair
value. It would appear that the industry is not pursuing such remedies for
some or all of the reasons previously discussed. Even if the U.S. industry
were to be successful in making its case, "proper measure" remedies'
would be insufficient to provide relief because they would not signifi-
cantly affect the aggregate problem.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was not to arrive at any definitive conclu-
sions concerning these complex issues. Rather, the purpose was to focus
introspectively on some considerations faced by the U.S. policy makers.
5 The following are samples of typical "Buy American Act" regulatory provisions:
Principles Governing Reciprocal Defense Cooperation, 32 C.F.R. § 6.104 (1983); Federal
Procurement Regulations, Buy American Act-Supply and Service Contracts, 41 C.F.R. § 1-
6.1 (1983).
0' Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830 (1982).
60 Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 169, 96 Stat.
2097 (1982).
61 Id.
62 Imposition of antidumping duties, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
62 Countervailing duties imposed, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982).
' The relevant laws were carefully constructed to measure out a response to subsidies
or sales below fair value exactly to compensate at the border for the level of the complained-
of activity, i.e., special antidumping duties are set precisely at the level of determined per-
centage that the relevant sales were below fair value, and special countervailing duties are
set at the percentage level determined to be the subsidy level.
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From the foregoing analysis, it seems that the United States is seized by
some endemic problems that must be addressed. Examination of the in-
ternal policies of U.S. trading partners serves many useful purposes and
might assist in seeking broader solutions to some of the U.S. core
problems. The United States now seems to be inclined to adopt many of
the practices of which it has been highly critical. Some of these contradic-
tions will greet each other in the context of high-technology competition.
It has only been recently that the United States has had to struggle
because imports were impacting substantially upon its domestic economy.
A review of the pattern of the U.S. reaction reflects dramatic change and
uncertainty in its approach. The United States has never really estab-
lished what might be called a foreign trade policy, nor has it had to focus
much upon the international competitive consequences of its domestic
policies. The trade shocks of the 1970's are forcing ever increasing recog-
nition by U.S. political leaders of the need for coordinated foreign trade
policies and for sensitivity to the fact that the United States cannot for-
mulate its domestic policies without giving weighty consideration as to
how those policies will posture the United States in the increasingly com-
petitive world markets. Many of these fundamental questions will be de-
bated during the years ahead in the context of high tech competition be-




Antidumping Investigations From Japan Since 1960*
1960 No prodeedings
1961 Rayon Garmet Labels
Portland Cement
Electrolytic Manganese






























SLFV - No Injury
NSLFV
SLFV - No Injury
NSLFV
NSLFV
SLFV - No Injury
NSLFV
NSLFV
SLFV - No Injury
NSLFV








1968 Aminoacetic acid NSLFV
Television Sets SLFV (12/5/70) Injury (3/9/71)
Loudspeakers NSLFV
Transformers NSLFV
* For more information on antidumping investigations, see footnote 2 and accompanying
text.
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Plate and float glass
Tempered Sheet Glass
Tapered Roller Bearings
1970 Bicycle Tires & Inner Tubes
Large Power Transformers
Door Latches
Fish nets and netting








TV Tubes - Color
Deflection Yokes
1972 Pipe and Tubing





















SLFV (1/9/71) Injury (4/17/71)
Discontinued
SLFV (1/9/71) Injury (4/17/71)
SLFV (5/5/71) Injury (8/7/71)
NSLFV
Discontinued
SLFV (1/21/72) Injury (4/25/72)
NSLFV
SLFV (1/19/72) Injury (4/22/72)
SLFV (11/2/71) Injury (1/26/72)
SLFV (3/24/72) Injury (6/23/72)
Discontinued
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV (6/24/72) Injury (9/22/72)
Discontinued
SLFV - No Injury
Discontinued
Discontinued
SLFV (12/5/72) Injury (3/1/73)
SLFV - No Injury




SLFV - No Injury
SLFV (6/7/73) Injury (9/7/73)
SLFV (2/15/73) Injury (5/15/73)
NSLFV





























Melamine in crystal form
1976 Automobile Body Dies
Digital Computer Scales
Metal-walled swimming pools







Sorbic Acid and Potassium
SLFV (9/10/73) Injury (12/10/
73)
SLFV (8/2/73) Injury (11/6/73)
NSLFVSLFV
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV (9/5/73) Injury (12/7/73)




SLFV - No Injury
SLFV (9/6/74) Injury (1/23/75)
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV - No Injury
NSLFV
SLFV (10/14/75) Injury (1/2/76)
NSLFV
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV (4/27/76) Injury (8/2/76)
Discontinued
NSLFV
SLFV - No Injury




SLFV (4/11/77) Injury (6/29/77)
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV (12/30/77) Injury (5/25/
78)
SLFV (1/13/78) Injury (4/24/78)
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV - No Injury
SLFV - No Injury
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Stainless Steel Round Wire
Spun Acrylic Yarn







Stainless Clad Steel Plate
Steel Wire Nails
1982 High Capacity Paging and
Alerting Devices
Portland Hydraulic Cement
Steel Pipes and Tubes




Steel Valves and Parts
Cyanauric Acid
Terminated (March 1, 1978)
Terminated (March 1, 1978)
Terminated (March 1, 1978)








SLFV (10/25/70) Injury (3/26/
80)
SLFV (3/21/80) Injury (5/7/80)
Terminated
SLFV (7/15/80) Injury (2/21/80)
SLFV (11/6/80) Injury (12/14/
80)
No Injury
Reopened but no injury
SLFV (5/21/82) Injury (7/8/82)
SLFV (6/24/82) Injury (7/29/82)
Terminated
SLFV (6/23/83) Injury (8/10/83)
SLFV (9/13/83) Injury
(Pending)
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
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